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The Minamata Convention on Mercury:
Past, Present, and Future Environmental Health
by Maggie Coulter*

I

Introduction

n October 2013, nearly six decades after health officials
first noted victims suffering from unregulated discharges of
methylmercury in Minamata, Japan, parties signed the Mercury Convention.1 An international treaty designed to protect
human health and the environment from anthropogenic releases
and emissions of mercury and mercury compounds, the Minamata Convention on Mercury is the newest multilateral environmental agreement registered with the United Nations.2 Currently,
the Convention has 96 signatories and only one ratified party, the
United States.3 When it enters into force, however, the costs and
difficulty of implementation may dilute the benefits of this new
global monitoring system. This feature describes the origins of
the Convention and potential implementation problems and concludes that despite these difficulties, the creation of a global risk
assessment for mercury, if properly implemented, will be invaluable in protecting environmental health worldwide.

Origins
The negative human health effects of mercury contamination and poisoning have been well-documented since the
1970s.4 But not until the occurrence of large-scale public health
catastrophes did the global community gain awareness of this
issue. The emergence of a strange and un-diagnosable ailment
in the fishing village of Minamata, Japan in 1956 which came
to be known as “Minamata disease” was the first and most wellknown of the mercury-caused public health emergencies that
emerged over time.5 For many years, however, the cause of this
“disease” was unknown; there is much controversy regarding
the Japanese government’s response to the outbreak of this “disease.” It was not until 25 years after the first outbreak that the
Japanese government finally acknowledged that releases of an
unwanted byproduct (methylmercury) of chemicals manufacturing offshore into the ocean by the Shin Nippon Chisso Hiryo
chemical plant were the source of the mysterious ailments that
afflicted the community.6
Victims of Minamata disease who ingested the methylmercury—a potent neurotoxin now known to accumulate into highly
toxic doses in the food chain7 and cause brain damage and birth
defects8—have struggled to get the Japanese government to
recognize the pollution disaster as well as obtain compensation
from the polluting chemical facility.9 As of March 2001, 2,265
victims have been officially recognized by the Japanese government (of whom 1,784 have died) and over 10,000 people received
financial compensation from Chisso.10 The number of victims,
however, varies widely between reporting in government sources
12

and the studies conducted by the local community. Further,
calculating the number of victims to begin with is even more
difficult because symptoms of mercury poisoning often do not
manifest until later in life, and varying degrees of affliction
result from varying levels of exposure.11
In the village of Minamata two different museums documenting and memorializing the public health catastrophe portray
vastly different pictures of Minamata disease, one reflecting the
government perspective, the other the villagers’.12 Further evidence of the distance between local and government perspectives
on mercury poisoning in Minamata is the fact that the Japanese
government lobbied aggressively to have the new mercury treaty
bear the name of the village, whereas the villagers in Minamata
vehemently opposed including their city’s name in the title.13

Future Research and Data Collection
The Minamata Convention on Mercury is a multilateral
environmental agreement designed to regulate and reduce
anthropogenic emissions and releases of mercury primarily to
prevent public health catastrophes like that which occurred in
Minamata, Japan.14 The treaty’s goals include “curbing mercury
emissions from coal-fired power plants and industrial facilities,
phasing out by 2020 many consumer products that contain mercury, “phasing down” the use of mercury in dental amalgams,
and closing all mercury mines within 15 years after the convention takes effect.”15 Many of the convention’s goals, however, are
essentially voluntary, qualified by the phrase “where feasible,”16
which may prevent attainment of these goals. Going forward,
the Convention does place significant emphasis on research and
information sharing among parties with emphasis on clarifying how mercury enters and moves through the environment.17
Recently emerging scientific evidence that global climate change
and ozone depletion compound the effects of methymercury
concentration further complicates this question.18

Minimata: A Global Risk Assessment Tool?
One important benefit of a global monitoring system for
methylmercury assessment is that data from less developed or
poorer countries will be taken to bear when determining global
risk of pollutant exposure.19 For instance, impacts on fishermen
in small villages like Minamata where methylmercury accumulation in fish and ocean sediment cause greater instances of
poisoning will be incorporated into risk assessments by national
governments and larger chemical corporations. Additionally,
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a global risk assessment will bring many different sources of
pollution together in one analysis. For methylmercury, this
is particularly important since initial emissions (such as the
discharge of effluent waste by the Shin Nippon Chisso Hiryo
chemical plant) is often less detrimental than the re-emission
of accumulated pollutants from the atmosphere or ocean sediment.20 Last, a global assessment would address the interplay of
global problems like climate change and the deterioration of the
earth’s ozone layer with methylmercury pollution.21 As global
warming and ozone deterioration compounds methylmercury
issues, a global assessment can better address the accumulation
of methylmercury pollution.22
The largest problems Parties of the Mercury Convention
will face are those of implementation.23 First, Party-states must
supply all data collected under the forthcoming regime to a
secretariat of the Convention, after which the data must be verified.24 This “trust but verify” implementation has the advantage
of a dual layer of accountability, but has the disadvantage of
redundancy.25 The consequent implementation of national monitoring systems and then a second layer of independent, unbiased
monitoring will vastly increase its cost. Further, many of the
existing data collection systems are outdated even in developed countries or simply do not yet exist in poorer countries.26
Adapting existing monitoring technology, as well as developing
new technologies where they are lacking will come at a significant cost.27 Moreover, though the Convention includes language
that calls on wealthier nations to assist poorer ones to aid in
developing their data-gathering capacities, as of yet there is no
concrete fund-sharing program.28
The final disadvantage of the Minamata Convention’s global
assessment lies in determining what the new data-collection
regime will actually measure.29 Which populations it should
measure requires choosing between poor populations with
high exposure rates where data collection is expensive and
already established collection centers in developed countries.30
Additionally, which sources of mercury pollution should

be measured range from volcanoes, direct pollution like the
effluent from the Shin Nippon Chisso Hiryo chemical plant
in Minamata, and even more nebulous re-emissions.31 Finally,
further research regarding the type of human measurements is
necessary.32 Choices range from more invasive blood collection
and analysis, to less invasive breast milk and urine sampling.33
In all instances, however, Convention implementers must choose
and then employ collection methods uniformly. And although
the implementing Parties of the Convention can look to other
successful pollutant-based conventions for guidance, like the
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants which
addresses ozone depletion, mercury pollution presents unique
issues all its own which will require even more uniquely tailored
responses.34

Conclusions
The benefits of the Minamata Convention’s global monitoring system are few but important when compared to the difficulty and expense of implementation. Access to a global risk
assessment is essential in determining a sound, science-based
global policy on mercury pollution. If the expense and difficulties of implementation can be overcome, a global assessment is a valuable tool for creating policy, particularly one that
must be streamlined across the globe in order to be effective.
Reflecting on the global data-collection regime of the Stockholm
Convention, the significant successes of such a global risk
assessment reflect that future use of such a tool, if properly and
effectively implemented, is invaluable.
Effective global implementation of the Minamata
Convention, however, will also need to rely on state-specific and
local policy development which may be obscured in a global risk
assessment. Proper implementation cannot discount the importance of state-specific responses to pollution on a local level.
Combining both local data collection and a global risk assessment will be essential for the Parties to effectively implement the
global data collection and assessment regime envisioned by the
Minamata Convention.
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